It is critical to remember details about meetings with healthcare providers. Forgetting could result in inadequate knowledge about ones' health, non-adherence with treatments, and poorer health outcomes. Hearing the health care provider plays a crucial role in consolidating information for recall. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has meant a rapid transition to videoconference-based medicine, here described as telehealth. When using telehealth speech must be filtered and compressed, and research has shown that degraded speech is more challenging to remember. Here we present (...) preliminary results from a study that compared memory for health information provided in-person to telehealth. The data collection for this study was stopped due to the pandemic, but the preliminary results are interesting because the pandemic forced a rapid transition to telehealth. To examine a potential memory deficit for health information provided through telehealth, we presented older and younger adults with instructions on how to use two medical devices. One set of instructions was presented in-person, and the other through telehealth. Participants were asked to recall the instructions immediately after the session, and again after a 1-week delay. Overall, the number of details recalled was significantly lower when instructions were provided by telehealth, both immediately after the session and after a 1-week delay. It is likely that a mix of technological and communication strategies by the healthcare provider could reduce this telehealth memory deficit. Given the rapid transition to telehealth due to COVID-19, highlighting this deficit and providing potential solutions are timely and of utmost importance. (shrink)

En posant avec clarté des questions de philosophie de l’esprit, d’ontologie et d’épistémologie, ce livre témoigne à la fois de l’intérêt réel de la danse comme objet philosophique et du rôle unique que peut jouer la philosophie dans une meilleure compréhension de cet art. Qu’est-ce que danser ? Que nous apprend le mouvement dansé sur la nature humaine et la relation entre le corps et l’esprit ? À quelles conditions une œuvre est-elle correctement interprétée par les danseurs et bien identifiée (...) par les spectateurs ? (shrink)

Margaret Moore offers a comprehensive normative theory of territory.

This essay argues that we have a duty to protect biodiversity hotspots, rooted in an argument about the wrongful imposition of risk and intergenerational justice. State authority over territory and resources is not unlimited; the state has a duty to protect these areas. The essay argues that although biodiversity loss is a global problem, it can be tackled at the domestic level through clear rules. The argument thus challenges the usual view of state sovereignty, which holds that authority over territory, (...) resources, and migration (all of which are connected to the protection of biodiversity hotspots) is unlimited. (shrink)

The Ethics of Nationalism blends philosophical discussion of the ethical merits and limits of nationalism with a detailed understanding of nationalist aspirations and a variety of national conflict zones. The author discusses the controversial and contemporary issues of rights of secession, the policies of the state in privileging a particular national group, the kinds of accommodations of minority national, and multi cultural identity groups that are justifiable and appropriate.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

This essay argues that the concept of ‘reasonableness’plays an important role in Scanlon's, Rawls's, and Barry's theories of justice (or morality). The relationship between moral motivation and reasonableness is critically analysed. Specifically, the paper questions whether it is plausible to impute to the agents of construction the desire ‘to justify our actions to others on impartial terms’. It also argues that most of the work is done by the assumption that people are reasonable rather than by the contractarian formulation. Indeed, (...) the paper argues, the argument could proceed entirely by making explicit and arguing for the moral assumptions embedded in the concept of reasonableness [1]. (shrink)

This chapter considers the extent to which the self-determination argument, which justifies a people in exercising jurisdictional authority over territory, can be extended to justify those people in exercising control over the flow of persons and goods across borders. It considers whether preventing people from entering a state is a violation of their rights to free movement and rights to subsistence. Whatever the legitimacy of the right to control borders, it has to be understood as at best a qualified right, (...) since it has to be pursued in ways consistent with basic human rights. Richer political communities, it is argued, have obligations to ensure that basic entitlements of people to live a decent life are met, even if that does not amount to a direct argument for open borders. (shrink)

This chapter examines the appropriate view of the relationship between territory, national communities, and self‐determination. It examines various arguments for territorial rights.

The current statist order assumes that states have a right to make rules involving the transfer and/or extraction of natural resources within the territory. Cosmopolitan theories of global justice have questioned whether the state is justified in its control over natural resources, typically by pointing out that having resources is a matter of good luck, and this unfairness should be addressed. This paper argues that self-determination does generate a right over resources, which others should not interfere with. It does not (...) entail, however, that there is no obligation on rich countries to redistribute to poor countries. Indeed, in some rare instances, it might be necessary for a particular political community to use its resources, but the presumption is that the collectively self-determining group should have the right to decide that. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article raises three concerns about Buchanan's argument related to the individualist description of ideology and psychological description of the obstacles to justice, as well as the way in which he separates empirical and normative beliefs, which, the article argues, are much more closely connected in all the examples that he raises. In the end, however, it agrees with Buchanan's central contention concerning the cognitive biases that interfere with progress towards justice, but, it argues, these operate at a more (...) sub‐conscious level than described by Buchanan. (shrink)

The paper analyses the interrelationship between Armstrong’s egalitarian theory and his treatment of the ‘attachment theory’ of resources, which is the dominant rival theory of resources that his theory is pitched against. On Armstrong’s theory, egalitarianism operates as a default position, from which special claims would need to be justified, but he also claims to be able to incorporate 'attachment' into his theory. The general question explored in the paper is the extent to which ‘attachment’ claims can be ‘married’ to (...) an egalitarian theory. The more specific argument is that a properly constrained attachment theory is more plausible than Armstrong’s egalitarian theory. It also criticizes attachment and improvement accounts as justifying permanent sovereignty over resources. The paper argues that neither of those arguments aim to justify the international doctrine of permanent sovereignty. (shrink)

This chapter sets out the main elements of the self-determination theory of territory. It argues that a ‘people’ has rights to jurisdictional authority over the geographical area that it legitimately occupies if and only if: a large majority of people are in a relationship with one another which is characterized by a shared political commitment to establish rules and practices of self-determination; they have the political capacity to establish and sustain institutions of political self-determination; and they possess an objective history (...) of political cooperation together, for example through state or substate institutions or in a resistance movement. To put ‘people’ in the right relation to land it discusses three place-related rights: moral rights of residency, which attach to individuals; moral rights of occupancy, which attach to groups; and rights to territory, which attach to people through their political institutions. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the analysis of the previous chapters indicates the problems attached to conceiving of morality as rooted in a neutral or Archimedean point from which different principles can be assessed and validated, but that it is more fruitful to root morality within a particular tradition. The problem of moral scepticism and relativism and pluralism are discussed as well as the implications of this approach to moral theorizing for ethical political principles.

This chapter considers whether collective self-determination, which justifies a right of jurisdiction, can also generate a right to control natural resources. It discusses the limits of that argument, focusing especially on the limits of justice. Part One deals with territorial claims over unoccupied islands, the seabed, the Arctic, and Antarctica. These are viewed as resources by the rival claimants, and their respective claims should be conceived of as property claims. The second part of the chapter deals with cases where there (...) are natural resources—oil, fertile land, water, coal—on land that is co-extensive with an area occupied by a group. It develops a middle ground between a strong resource rights conception, associated with current views of state sovereignty, and the cosmopolitan view that thinks of groups as having no special claims to resources within their midst, indeed thinking of it as a kind of undeserved advantage. (shrink)

Associative duties—duties inherent to some of our relationships—are most commonly discussed in terms of intimate associations such as of families, friends, or lovers. In this essay I ask whether impersonal associations such as state or nation can also give rise to genuinely associative duties, i.e., duties of patriotism or nationalism. I distinguish between the two in terms of their objects: the object of patriotism is an institutionalized political community, whereas the object of nationalism is a group of people who share (...) a common identity, often grounded in a belief in shared history, and an aspiration for collective self-government together. I explore three arguments for the thesis that a special concern for one’s polity and fellow-citizens, or one’s nation and co-nationals, is an associative duty: from reciprocity, from collective self-determination, and from the well-being of compatriots or co-nationals. I argue that the relationship among compatriots is a more plausible contender for generating associative duties than the relationship among co-nationals, although even in this case there are questions whether these are genuinely associative duties, or simply special duties. Although the relationship among co-nationals is a less plausible contender for associative duties, the well-being argument does apply to the relationship among both co-nationals and compatriots. I also suggest that there is a certain privileging of the status quo in the way that associative duties arguments work, because they tend to operate from existing relations and associations. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between justice and colonialism. It defines colonialism; examines the kind of injustice that colonialism involved; and the possibility of corrective justice.

This article is interested in the general question of what justifies territorial rights over unoccupied places, including places that are not occupied but are situated within the territorial borders of a state. This question arises because one of the most common defenses of rights over territory makes use of the idea of occupancy and has difficulty explaining such rights in places that are not occupied. It explores this question through an examination of the claims and arguments in the Canadian Arctic, (...) which provides an historically specific test case for the merits and plausibility of the various arguments appealed to. It argues that territorial rights in unoccupied places, including the Canadian Arctic, are justified on different grounds than in occupied parts of the territory, and that the justification also affects the kinds of rights—particularly over resources—that such states can claim. (shrink)

The three major normative theories of secession are just-cause theories, choice theories, and national self-determination theories. Just-cause and choice theories are problematic because they view secession in terms of the application of liberal theories of justice or a liberal principle of autonomy, without regard for the dynamics of nationalist mobilitization and national politics. National self-determination theories can be supported by a collective autonomy argument. This is related to a particular view of the relationship between collective self-government and territory.

This introductory chapter examines the debates concerning who are the people and the relevant territorial unit in which they should exercise self‐determination. It distinguishes between three types of arguments concerning conditions under which there might be a right to secede: choice theories, just‐cause theories, and national self‐determination theories.

(1996). A “reasonable” immigration policy. The European Legacy: Vol. 1, Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the study of European Ideas, pp. 520-525.

This chapter summarizes the central argument of the book, and emphasizes the practical need for a theory of territory, as conflict over land is likely to increase. It also argues that conflict is exacerbated by the lack of consensus on the normative importance of land and the appropriate relationship between land, the state and people.

This chapter critically examines the two main versions of statist theories of territory, associated with the accounts given by Hobbes and Kant about the link between jurisdictional control over land and the fulfilment of the purpose of the state, which makes territorial right contingent on the achievement of those goods. The Hobbesian version identifies the achievement of peace, stability, coordination, and order as the function of the state and then justifies territorial rights as necessary to an effective state order. The (...) more moralized version, associated with Kant and contemporary Kantians, links the state with the achievement of justice, and argues that territorial rights should be accorded to a legitimate state. (shrink)

Gauthier and the Full‐knowledge Contract. This chapter examines Gauthier's Morals by Agreement, which generates principles of justice from the starting point of the individual agent as self‐interested utility‐maximizer.

This chapter offers a conceptual analysis of territory, distinguishes it from property accounts, and discusses different versions of property accounts, all derived from Locke’s ‘Second Treatise of Government’. It offers a conceptual analysis of territory and the various rights associated with territory. According to Locke, territorial right is established through the subjection, by free consent, of persons and their land to state authority. This theory is found to rest on a number of flawed assumptions, among them claims to natural rights (...) of property and an obvious link between private property and territorial jurisdiction. Cara Nine draws on Lockean principles to claim that a state is a collective that, like individuals, owns property, namely the territory of the state. After examining the historical antecedents of such ideas, the chapter points away from them and towards accounts of territory based on individual and collective claims of rights. (shrink)

This chapter argues why we need a political theory of territory. We need it because the entire usable earth is divided into territorially distinct states, and the territorialization process is not complete yet, as states extend their control to the seabed, the oceans, and other uninhabited places. Yet we have no overarching theory of what justifies territory, how boundaries should be drawn or territorial disputes resolved. This lacuna extends to a range of disciplines, which have barely addressed territory itself. In (...) political philosophy, for example, there has been a focus on the relationship between state and citizen, but hardly any focus on territory. At the heart of this chapter, beyond motivating the book as a whole, is the claim that justifying authority over citizens is distinct from justifying authority over territory, and requires a separate argument. (shrink)

This chapter examines arguments that link national community with a particular type of culture, and then links culture with something that is valued. Versions of this argument have been put forward by Tamir, Miller, Kymlicka, MacCormick, Margalit, and Raz. This chapter argues that it is important to distinguish between a culture and national identity.

This chapter defines the main terms and the project of the book, and specifically situates the problem of the relation of self‐interest and morality in the larger philosophical context.

Using the theft of Indigenous land and territory and the destruction of Indigenous political authorities as an example, this paper examines two theories of territorial rights in relation to their treatment of historical territorial injustices. We apply Simmons’s historical theory of rights over territory, and the occupancy/self-determination theory of territorial rights associated with Moore and Stilz, to three problems: the Continuity Problem, the Particularity Problem, and the Distributive Justice Problem. We argue that the occupancy/self-determination theory is more promising for (...) resolving all three, but that the historical title theory can also be modified to accommodate this insight. (shrink)

This chapter is concerned with moral arguments about membership in a national community, focusing on David Miller's On Nationality and Tom Hurka's article ‘The Justification of National Partiality’. It examines the bonds of attachment that co‐nationals feel towards those who share the same national identity, and the moral importance that should be placed on that.

In recent years numerous multi-national states have disintegrated along national lines, and today many more continue to witness bitter secessionist struggles. This ambitious study brings together for the first time a series of original essays on the ethics of secession. A host of leading figures explore key issues in this important debate, including, what is `a people' and what gives them a right to secede? And is national self-determination consistent with liberal and democratic principles or is it a dangerous doctrine?

This book is an original critique of contemporary liberal theories of justice, focusing on the problem of how to relate the personal point of view of the individual to the impartial perspective of justice. Margaret Moore's examination of prominent contemporary arguments for liberal justice reveals that individualist theories are subject to two serious difficulties: the motivation problem and the integrity problem. Individualists cannot explain why the individual should be motivated to act in accordance with the dictates of liberal (...) justice, andDSrelated to thisDSoffer radically incoherent accounts of the person. Revisionist liberal attempts to ground liberalism in contextual and perfectionist terms offer more defensible foundations, but Dr Moore argues that such theories do not support liberal political principles. She concludes by sketching a historical and concrete approach to political and ethical theorizing which reformulates the relation between self-interest and morality, and is not subject to the problems that beset liberal individualist theories of justice. Her book advances the debate between communitarians and liberals about the kind of moral foundation which a liberal society requires. (shrink)

This paper focuses on land as a domain in which legitimate expectations can give rise to entitlements. The central argument is that people are connected to other people and to projects, which are symbolically and materially rooted in particular places. This gives rise to an interest – an interest that is sufficiently weighty that it imposes obligations on other people – to protect stability of place. There are two ways in which legitimate expectations structure argument about land. It justifies liberty (...) rights to remain in a place, and not be removed or expelled from it, independently of the coercion that often accompanies forcible expulsion, and argue for rights of return as a second-order right when this right has been violated. I also argue that passage of time in a changed context can affect people’s legitimate expectations, and so their entitlements. (shrink)